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Abstract
Mining blocks on a blockchain equipped with a proof of work consensus protocol
is well-known to be resource-consuming. A miner bears the operational cost, mainly
electricity consumption and IT gear, of mining, and is compensated by a capital gain
when a block is discovered. This paper aims at quantifying the profitability of min-
ing when the possible event of ruin is also considered. This is done by formulating
a tractable stochastic model and using tools from applied probability and analysis,
including the explicit solution of a certain type of advanced functional differential
equation. The expected profit at a future time point is determined for the situation
when the miner follows the protocol as well as when he/she withholds blocks. The
obtained explicit expressions allow us to analyze the sensitivity with respect to the
different model components and to identify conditions under which selfish mining
is a strategic advantage.
Keywords: Blockchain; miner; cryptocurrency; ruin theory; dual risk model.
1 Introduction
A blockchain is a distributed public data ledger maintained by achieving consensus among
a number of nodes in a Peer-to-Peer network. The nodes, referred to as miners, are re-
sponsible for the validity of the information recorded in the blocks. Each miner stores a
local copy of the data and competes to solve a cryptographic puzzle. The first miner who
is able to propose a solution includes the pending information in a block and collects a
reward. The mining process is energy-consuming and costly in terms of equipment. The
goal of the present paper is to provide insights into how profitable it is to engage in mining
activities when keeping the aforementionned expenses in mind.
Miners are supposed to follow an incentive-compatible protocol which consists of releasing
immediately any newly discovered block and appending it to the longest existing branch
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of the blockchain. By doing so, miners are paid in proportion to their contribution to the
overall computational effort. It was shown by Kroll et al. [14] that following the protocol
is a dominant strategy leading to a consistent history of transactions. Later, Eyal and
Sirer [6] introduced a blockwithholding strategy, called selfish mining, that allows a pool
of miners to get a revenue, relative to the network revenue, that is greater than its fair
share of the computing power. This strategy consists, for a miner or a mining pool, in
hiding discovered blocks before broadcasting them to the network at well-chosen times
to fork the chain. By expanding their private branch, selfish miners try to get the upper
hand over the honest nodes as the fork develops until it resolves. Other blockwithholding
strategies were presented in Sapirshtein et al. [21] and Nayak et al. [18] leading to an
optimized relative revenue. These strategies imply a lower revenue, even for the malicious
nodes, which led Grunspan and Marco-Pérez in a series of contributions [13, 10, 12, 11]
to label them as not profitable. The authors pointed out that the time required to im-
plement such a scheme can be rather long and the time before it becomes profitable
even longer exposing them to a significant risk of going bankrupt. Blockchain protocols
usually calibrate the difficulty of the cryptopuzzle to ensure a steady flow of confirmed
information. The difficulty is adjusted periodically to account for the evolution of the
computing power of the network. Because block withholding strategies impede the speed
of the block generating process, their application will cause a decrease in the cryptopuz-
zle difficulty for the next round. The selfish miners then resume to protocol and increase
their revenue. Furthermore, the waste of resources will drive some honest miners out of
the game, increasing the colluding miners’ share of the network computing power. Yet
another side effect of selfish mining, noted in Eyal and Sirer [6], is that the revenue of
the selfish miners will entice honest miners to join them. The pool will grow and may
accumulate more than 50% of the resources putting them in position to perform double
spending attacks, described in Nakamoto [17], Rosenfeld [20] and Goffard [8].
In this paper we model the surplus of a miner by a stochastic process that is inspired by
risk processes considered for the study of the surplus in insurance portfolios, for which
a detailed understanding concerning the probability of that surplus to become negative
is available (see e.g. Asmussen and Albrecher [1] for an overview). The latter event is
referred to as ruin in the insurance context, and we will adopt this terminology in the
present setup, even if the investigation of the event of running out of money can be seen
as a risk management tool rather than bankruptcy in the literal sense. The profitability
will be assessed by computing the expected surplus of a miner at some time horizon given
that ruin did not occur until then. It will turn out that under reasonably realistic model
assumptions, one can derive closed form expressions for this quantity when letting the
time horizon be random, and more in particular, exponentially distributed. Apart from
tractability, the assumption of an exponential time horizon also has a natural interpreta-
tion in terms of lack-of-memory as to when the surplus process will be observed for the
assessment of the profitability. Note that the selfish mining strategy considered in this
paper is a simplified version of the one studied in Eyal and Sirer [6], with the purpose of
allowing an explicit treatment for the value function under consideration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a stochastic model for the
surplus process of a miner and derives formulas for safety and profitability measures for
a miner that follows the prescribed protocol. Mathematically, our profitability analysis
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will lead to the solution of differential equations with advanced arguments. In Section 3,
the study is then extended to the situation of a selfish miner and the resulting system
of differential equations with advanced arguments is analytically solved in Appendix B
and C. Section 4 subsequently uses the obtained explicit expressions for numerical studies
and sensitivity tests with respect to model parameters in order to determine whether
block withholding strategies are profitable or not. We find that selfish mining may be
profitable, but always to a lesser extent than following the protocol. We also provide
a numerical comparison of the proposed selfish mining strategy to the original strategy
of Eyal and Sirer. In Section 5, we consider a time horizon large enough to include a
difficulty adjustment. We show that, depending on the electricity price, in the presence of
difficulty adjustments selfish mining may in fact outperform the alternative of following
the protocol. In Section 6 we conclude and outline some directions for future research.
2 Ruin and expected surplus of a miner following the
protocol
A miner, referred to as Sam, starts operating with an initial surplus level u > 0. We
consider the following stochastic model for the surplus process over time. Mining blocks
generates steady operational costs of amount c > 0 per unit of time, most notably due to
electricity consumption. The entire network of miners appends blocks to the blockchain
at an exponential rate λ, which means that the length of the blockchain over time is
governed by a Poisson process (Nt)t≥0 with intensity λ. We assume that Sam owns
a fraction p ∈ (0, 1/2) of the overall computing power, which implies that each block is
published by Sam with a probability p. The number of blocks found by Sam and therefore
the number of rewards of size b > 0 he collects up to time t ≥ 0 is a thinned Poisson
process (Ñt)t≥0 with intensity λ and thinning parameter p. Sam’s surplus Rt at time t is
then given by
Rt = u+ b · Ñt − c · t, t ≥ 0. (1)
The stochastic process (Rt)t≥0 resembles the so-called dual risk process in risk theory, see
for instance Avanzi et al. [3]. The focus of this paper is the profitability of mining blocks
on the blockchain, but subject to a ruin constraint. In this context, the time of ruin
τu = inf{t ≥ 0 : Rt = 0} is defined as the first time when the surplus reaches zero, i.e.
the miner runs out of money and cannot continue to operate. The riskiness of the mining
business may be assessed via the finite-time and infinite-time horizon ruin probabilities
defined as
ψ(u, t) = P(τu ≤ t), and ψ(u) = P(τu <∞), (2)
respectively. The rewards earned through mining must in expectation exceed the oper-
ational cost per time unit. The latter condition translates into pλb > c, and is referred
to as the net profit condition in standard risk theory, see [1]. In particular, this implies
ψ(u) < 1, i.e. ruin does not occur almost surely. The profitability for a time horizon t > 0
is now measured by
V (u, t) = E(Rt · Iτu>t), (3)
where IA denotes the indicator random variable of an event A. Correspondingly, V (u, t)
is the expected surplus level at time t, where in the case of ruin up to t this surplus is
0 (i.e., due to the ruin event the surplus is frozen in at 0). In terms of a conditional
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expectation, one can equivalently express V (u, t) as the probability to still be alive at t
times the expected value of the surplus at that time given that ruin has not occurred:
V (u, t) = (1− ψ(u, t)) · E(Rt|τu > t).
The following result provides formulas for the ruin probabilities and V (u, t) in this setting.
Proposition 2.1.












2. For any u ≥ 0, the infinite-time ruin probability is given by
ψ(u) = e−θ∗u, (5)
where θ∗ is the positive solution in θ of the equation
c θ + pλ (e−b θ − 1) = 0. (6)
3. For any u ≥ 0, the expected surplus at time t in case ruin has not occurred until
then, can be written as
V (u, t) = E
[(
















where (.)+ denotes the positive part, ∧ stands for the minimum operator and
(Gn(·|{. . .})n∈N is the sequence of Abel-Gontcharov polynomials defined in Appendix
A.
Proof. 1. The ruin time τu may be rewritten as
τu = inf
{
t ≥ 0 ; Ñt = ct/b− u/b
}
.




, k ≥ 0,
when the function t 7→ ct/b− u/b reaches integer levels. For t > 0, define the set of















where the last equality follows from applying Corollary 3.4 of Goffard and Lefevre
[9] and is equivalent to (4).
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2. This result is standard, see e.g. [1, Th.VI.2.1]. For the sake of completeness, we still
prefer to give the main idea behind its derivation and the probabilistic reason for
Equation (6) here. The process {eθ(ct−bÑt)−tκ(θ)}t≥0, is a martingale for any θ ∈ R,
where κ(θ) = logE(ecθ−bθÑ1), see e.g. [1, Th.II.2.1]. The simplest choice for θ is the
one for which κ(θ) = 0 , i.e.
cθ + pλ(e−bθ − 1) = 0.





is therefore a martingale. It then follows by the Optional Stopping
Theorem (cf. [1, Prop.II.3.1]) that
ψ(u) = e−θ∗u,
since under the assumptions on Rt (with only upward jumps) the surplus at the
time of ruin is necessarily zero.
3. Using the tower property, we can express the value function (3) as
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where U1:n, . . . , Un:n denote the order statistics of n i.i.d. standard uniform random
variables. Using the interpretation of Abel-Gontcharov polynomials as the joint
probabilities of uniform order statistics, see Goffard and Lefevre [9, Prop.2.4] then
yields (7).
Expression (7) is unfortunately not of closed form. The Abel-Gontcharov polynomials may
be evaluated recursively, and acceptable approximations follow from simple truncation
or simulation. However, we are interested in a more explicit and amenable expression
for this quantity. In addition, the choice of the considered time horizon t is somewhat
arbitrary. We therefore propose now to replace the fixed time horizon t by an independent
exponential random time horizon T with mean t. This will allow us to derive a simple
and explicit expression for the respective quantity, which hopefully will provide a good
approximation of V (u, t). At the same time, this random time horizon also has an intuitive
interpretation on its own: it can be seen as the first epoch of an independent homogeneous
Poisson process, so that there is a lack-of-memory as to when exactly the surplus level is
going to be evaluated, with the expected value of that time horizon being t. We hence
consider the value function
V̂ (u, t) := E(V (u, T )) = E(RT Iτu>T ), (9)
where T ∼ Exp(t).
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Proposition 2.2. For any u ≥ 0, the value function V̂ (u, t) satisfies the differential
equation





V̂ (u, t)− pλV̂ (u+ b, t)− u
t
= 0 (10)
with boundary condition V̂ (0, t) = 0 and 0 ≤ V̂ (u, t) ≤ u− ct+ pλt for u > 0, a solution
of which is given by
V̂ (u, t) = u+ (pλb− c) t (1− eρ∗u), (11)
where ρ∗ is the negative solution of the equation
− cρ+ pλ (eb ρ − 1) = 1/t. (12)
Proof. Let 0 < h < u/c, so that ruin can not occur in the interval (0, h). We distinguish
three cases:
(i) T > h and there is no block discovery in the interval (0, h),
(ii) T < h and there is no block discovery in the interval (0, T ),
(iii) There is a block discovery before time T and in the interval (0, h).
By conditioning we see that









pλ e−s(1/t+pλ) V̂ (u− cs+ b, t)ds.
Now we take the derivative with respect to h and set h = 0 to obtain





V̂ (u, t)− pλV̂ (u+ b, t)− u
t
= 0, (13)
with boundary condition V̂ (0, t) = 0 and such that 0 ≤ V̂ (u, t) ≤ u− ct+ pλt for u > 0.
Here the derivative is with respect to the first argument (note that the above derivation
automatically guarantees the existence of the derivative V̂ ′(u, t)). Equation (13) is an
advanced functional differential equation. In order to identify its solution, consider the
form
V̂ (u, t) = Aeρu +Bu+ C, u ≥ 0, (14)
where A,B,C and ρ are constants to be determined. Substituting (14) in (13) together
with the boundary condition yields the system of equations
0 = ctρ+ (1 + pλt)− pλteρb,
0 = B (1 + tpλ)− pλtB − 1,
0 = Bct+ C(1 + tpλ)− pλtBb− pλtC,
0 = A+ C.
We then have A = −t(pλb− c), B = 1, C = t(pλb− c) and ρ is solution of Equation (12),
which admits one negative and one positive solution. As A < 0, we have to choose the
negative solution ρ∗ < 0 in order to ensure V̂ (u, t) > 0. Substituting A,B,C and ρ∗ in
(14) yields the result.
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Remark 2.1. Equation (10) is a particular case of an advanced functional differential
equation (concretely, a differential equation with an advanced argument). Strictly speak-
ing, a priori one cannot exclude the possibility of other possible solutions than the one
derived above, as (to the best of our knowledge) no general mathematical theory con-
cerning uniqueness of the solution exists for the given boundary conditions. To establish
uniqueness mathematically, one would typically need to specify a boundary condition for
V̂ (u, t) on the entire (but small) interval u ∈ [0, b] for any t (see e.g. [22]). Assuming
E(RT Iτu>T ) = u+ (pλb− c) t (1− eρ
∗u), u ∈ [0, b] (15)
as an additional boundary condition would then establish (11) as the unique solution of
(10) for all u ≥ 0, and hence formally establish that the value function (9) coincides
with (11) (by uniqueness any other possibility is then ruled out). Indeed, condition
(15) can be checked to hold by stochastic simulation of E(RT Iτu>T ) (and we successfully
confirmed that validity for numerous combinations of parameters), so that we know to
have captured the right formula for V̂ (u, t) despite the unusual boundary conditions of
the advanced functional differential equation. 2
Remark 2.2. Note that, as the solution of (12), ρ∗ can be expressed through the Lambert
W function, see Corless et al. [5], with













Furthermore, the similarity of the equations (6) and (12) (referred to as Lundberg equations
in risk theory) is no coincidence. In contrast to the probabilistic derivation of (6) presented
in the proof of Proposition 2.1, one could also mimick the analytic approach above and
identify ψ(u) as the solution of the differential equation cψ′(u) +pλ(ψ(u)−ψ(u+ b)) = 0,
of which (6) is the characteristic equation (here θ = −ρ). 2
We now complement the results of Proposition 2.1. Define
ψ̂(u, t) := E(ψ(u, T )) = P(τu < T ), u ≥ 0, t > 0 (16)
as the ruin probability up to an (independent) exponential time horizon T with mean t.
Note that
ψ̂(u, t) = E(P(T > τu|τu)) = E(e−δτu),
with δ = 1/t. Thus, ψ̂(u, t) is the Laplace transform of the ruin time density. In actuarial
language, it is the expected present value (evaluated with the force of interest δ) of 1 that
is paid at the time of ruin.
This quantity turns out to have a very simple form (see also Asmussen et al. [2] for
ruin probabilities up to a random time horizon in the classical risk model):
Proposition 2.3. We have
ψ̂(u, t) = eρ∗u, (17)
where ρ∗ is the negative solution in ρ of Equation (12).
Proof. It can be verified that the process {exp(−δt1 + ρ∗Rt1)}t1≥0 is a martingale. From
the Optional Stopping Theorem it follows that the expectation at the time of ruin is equal
to its initial value, which is precisely Formula (17).
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Remark 2.3. While the probabilistic proof given above is in the spirit of the proof of
(5), one can alternatively, akin to the approach for proving Proposition 2.2, also follow
the analytic route and show that ψ̂(u, t) is the solution of the differential equation
cψ̂′(u, t) + (pλ+ 1/t) ψ̂(u, t)− pλ ψ̂(u+ b, t) = 0 (18)
with initial condition ψ̂(0, t) = 1 and boundary condition limu→∞ ψ̂(u, t) = 0, where the
derivative is with respect to the first argument. This is in fact the homogeneous equation
of (13) and gives a nice interpretation of the term 1/t as the intensity of the dynamic
time horizon when moving along the surplus trajectory Rt. Trying a solution of the form
ψ̂(u, t) = Aeρu + C then immediately leads to the result, since the boundary condition
forces C = 0 and the initial condition gives A = 1, whereas the exponent ρ has to be the
negative solution of (12) (to establish the uniqueness of the solution of (18) one would
again have to argue as in Remark 2.1). 2
Comparing the expression (4) for ψ(u, t) with deterministic time horizon t and (17)
for ψ̂(u, t) with random time horizon (of the same expected value) shows the substantial
simplification one can achieve through the principle of randomization. We refer to Section
4 for a numerical comparison of the two quantities.
3 Ruin and expected surplus of a selfish miner
It has been discussed in the literature for a while already that it may be advantageous to
keep newly found blocks hidden (see e.g. [6]). Such a block withholding strategy is referred
to as selfish mining. The goal is to build up a stock of blocks and release them publicly
at well chosen times so as to fork the chain and make a part of the mining activities of
competitors worthless, depending on which branch is followed up in the longer run. A
fork happens when two equally long versions of the blockchain coexist, and it resolves
whenever one of them becomes longer by at least one block. In the sequel, we consider a
variant of the selfish mining strategy introduced by Eyal and Sirer [6]. Let (Nt)t≥0 be the
homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ that governs the block discovery process
of the entire network. As in the previous section, we consider a miner named Sam who
owns a share p ∈ (0, 1) of the computing power so that a newly found block belongs to
Sam with probability p. We keep track of Sam’s lead over the honest chain in terms of
number of blocks via a Markov jump process
Xt = ZNt , t ≥ 0,
where (Zk)k≥0 is a homogeneous Markov chain with finite state space E = {0, 1, 0∗} which
we define now. Assume that at time t ≥ 0, the miners have published Nt = k blocks.
• If Sam is not hiding any block, then Zk = 0,
– if Sam finds the next block, he stores it in a buffer and Zk+1 = 1,
– if the other miners discover a block then Sam’s buffer remains empty Zk+1 = 0,
In both cases, Sam is not collecting any reward.
• If Sam is hiding one block at that time, then Zk = 1,
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– if he then finds a new block, then he broadcasts both blocks immediately (which
resets the Markov chain to Zk+1 = 0), and he collects two rewards,
– if the others find a block, then Sam also releases his block leading to a fork
situation characterized by Zk+1 = 0∗. At that moment Sam is not collecting
any rewards.
• If a fork situation is present at that time (Zk = 0∗), then
– if Sam finds a new block then he appends it to his branch of the chain and
collects the reward for two blocks and Zk+1 = 0.
– if the others find a block then
∗ they append it to Sam’s branch with a probability 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, in which
case Sam gets the reward for one block.
∗ If the block is mined on top of the competing branch, then Sam earns
nothing.
In both cases, the number of hidden blocks then becomes Zk+1 = 0.








Figure 1: Transition graph of the Markov chain (Zk)k≥0 representing the stock of blocks
retained by Sam when implementing the simplified selfish mining strategy.
the reward collecting process. The surplus process of Sam introduced in (1) now becomes
Rt = u− c · t+ b ·
N(t)∑
n=1
f [Zn−1, ξn, ζn] , (19)
where the (ξn)n≥1 and (ζn)n≥1 are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter p and
q, respectively, and
f [Zn−1, ξn, ζn] =

0, if Zn−1 = 0,
0, if Zn−1 = 1 & ξn = 0,
2, if Zn−1 = 1 & ξn = 1,
0, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 0 & ζn = 0,
1, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 0 & ζn = 1,
2, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 1.
(20)
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Remark 3.1. In contrast to the selfish mining strategy defined above, Eyal and Sirer’s [6]
more general selfish mining strategy does not automatically release the blocks when the
buffer reaches size two. On the contrary, the stock is being built up continuously and the
selfish miner releases one block for every block found by the others. As soon as the level of
the buffer goes back to two, the selfish miner releases the last two blocks to win over the
fork situation. The process (Zn)n≥0 remains a proper Markov chain, and the study of its
stationary distribution allowed Eyal and Sirer [6] to show how the relative revenue of the
selfish miner exceeds his fair share. However, the fact that the state space of (Zn)n≥0 is
then not finite anymore prevents a solution of the resulting system of differential equations
along the lines of Theorem B.1 and Corollary C.1 given below. The reward function (the
analogue of (20)) for Eyal and Sirer’s strategy is given by
f [Zn−1, ξn, ζn] =

0, if Zn−1 = 0,
0, if Zn−1 = 1,
2, if Zn−1 = 2 & ξn = 0,
0, if Zn−1 ≥ 2 & ξn = 1,
1, if Zn−1 > 2 & ξn = 0,
0, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 0 & ζn = 0,
1, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 0 & ζn = 1,
2, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 1.
(21)
The expected income is here higher as soon as the miner manages to accumulate more than
two blocks. At the same time, compared to (20) we notice a delay in the earning process
(21) when Zn−1 = 2 and ξn = 1, which may impair the miner’s solvency. Consequently,
for the consideration of solvency aspects we prefer to focus on our slightly simpler selfish
mining strategy here. Nevertheless, a simulation study is conducted in Section 4.3 to
compare numerically the revenue and ruin probability of a miner implementing Eyal and
Sirer’s selfish mining strategy instead of the variant studied in this paper. 2
It is interesting to see whether selfish mining is still profitable for Sam if the possibility








This quantity can be determined if we assume that Sam has been mining in a selfish way
for quite some time already, so that we can consider the Markov chain to be in stationarity
with stationary probabilities
P(Z = 0) = 11 + 2p− p2 , P(Z = 1) =
p
1 + 2p− p2 , and P(Z = 0
∗) = p(1− p)1 + 2p− p2 .
The quantities Uk := f (Zk−1, ξk, ζk) , n ≥ 1 then have a p.m.f. pU(·) := P(U = ·) given
by
pU(0) =
1 + p(1− p) + p(1− p)2(1− q)
1 + 2p− p2 , pU(1) =
pq(1− p)2
1 + 2p− p2 , and pU(2) =
p2 + p2(1− p)
1 + 2p− p2 ,
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and the net profit condition correspondingly reads
γ = bλqp(1− p)
2 + 4p2 − 2p3
1 + 2p− p2 − c > 0. (23)
The profitability of selfish mining consequently depends on the interplay between the
probabilities p and q, and not all values of p and q will lead to positive expected profit.
If we assume for a moment that the Uk’s are i.i.d. with p.m.f. pU (which is of course a
strongly simplifying assumption) and the net profit condition holds, then the infinite-time
ruin probability is given by
ψ(u) = e−θ∗u,
where θ∗ is the unique positive root of the equation
cθ + λ
[
pU(0) + e−bθpU(1) + e−2bθpU(2)− 1
]
= 0.
The proof is anologous to the one of Proposition 2.1. Deriving the actual ruin probability
and the expected surplus under ruin constraints at some deterministic time horizon is more
difficult than in the previous section. However, for the exponential time horizon (with
mean t), we are able to derive an explicit formula for V̂ (u, t). Since the reward process is
modulated by the Markov chain, we have to derive the value function depending on the
current state of the Markov chain. The result below in principle provides a formula for
V̂z(u, t) ≡ E(Vz(u, T )) = E
(
RT Iτu>T
∣∣∣∣Z0 = z) (24)
with T ∼ Exp(t) for any z ∈ {0, 1, 0∗}. The most interesting among these is V̂0(u, t),
which refers to the situation where the buffer is empty at the beginning. Theorem B.1,
in Appendix B, provides a tractable formula for V̂0(u, t) with
V̂0(u, t) = A1 eρ1 u + eρ2 u [A2 cos (ρ3 u) + A3 sin (ρ3 u)] + u+ C, (25)
where A1, A2, A3, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 and C are constants defined in the statement of Theorem B.1
in Appendix B.
Remark 3.2. If the connectivity parameter q equals 1, then the selfish miner will not
waste any blocks by withholding them first, he will just append them later. In that
sense his surplus process, and correspondingly the value function, is very similar to the
one when following the protocol, with the subtle difference that by receiving the rewards
later, the likelihood of ruin is increased (reducing the value function). When the initial
capital increases indefinitely, that effect evaporates and then the only remaining difference
between the two is that for the expected surplus at the evaluation time horizon T ∼ Exp(t)
the initial state still matters for the selfish miner, since starting – with the same initial
capital u – in state 0∗ or 1 will lead to overall one more block than when starting in
state 0 (i.e., with an empty buffer). This latter difference should then itself disappear
when t increases indefinitely. Checking this, V̂ (u, t) − u in (11) converges to (pλb − c)t,
and V̂0(u, t) − u in (25) converges to C, as u → ∞. While C defined (36) of Appendix
B is a rather involved function of the parameter t, a simple calculation shows that, for
q = 1 (and only then!), C/t→ pλb− c as t→∞, so that the two expressions are indeed
asymptotically equivalent. For a numerical comparison of V̂0(u, t) and V̂ (u, t) for finite
values of u and t, see Section 4. 2
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Finally, the ruin probability for the selfish miner up to an exponential time horizon can
be obtained in an analogous (and slightly simpler) way. Corollary C.1, in Appendix C,
provides the following expression for the ruin probability of a selfish miner
ψ̂0(u, t) = C1 eρ1 u + eρ2 u [C2 cos (ρ3 u) + C3 sin (ρ3 u)] , (26)
where C1, C2, C3, ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 are constants defined in the statement of Corollary C.1 in
Appendix C.
4 Numerical illustrations and sensitivity analysis
In this section, we are going to use the formula for the ruin probabilities and expected sur-
plus in case ruin did not occur derived in the previous sections for numerical illustrations
and in particular also for sensitivity analysis with respect to the involved parameters. We
will first study the profitability of following the protocol in Section 4.1 and proceed to the
profitability of selfish mining in Section 4.2. We define the expected profit as the expected
surplus under ruin constraints minus the initial capital.
Throughout this section, the time unit is one hour. Since the Bitcoin blockchain protocol
is designed to ensure that one block of confirmed transactions is added to the blockchain
about every ten minutes, this renders the block arrival intensity in our model to be λ = 6.
The reward b is determined by the number nBTC of bitcoins earned when finding a block
and the price πBTC of the bitcoin. For the illustrations in this paper, we use the data of
January 1, 2020, when nBTC = 12.5 and πBTC = $7, 174.741, so that the reward amounts
to
b = nBTC × πBTC = $89, 684.30.
We assume that the operational cost of mining reduces to the electricity consumed when
computing hashes. On January 1, 2020, the yearly consumption of the network was
estimated by the Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index2 to 72.1671 TWh.3
We denote by
W = 72.1671× 10
9
365.25× 24
the electricity consumption of the network expressed in kWh. We let the operational cost
c of a given miner be proportional to its share p ∈ (0, 1) of the network computing power
with
c = p×W × πW ,




3The choice of this concrete date for the illustrations in this paper is somewhat arbitrary. Choosing
another date and estimate of the Bitcoin price will, however, not crucially change the conclusions as long
as the reward for finding a block compensates the operational cost.
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4.1 Expected profit computations for a miner following the pro-
tocol
We assume now the assumptions of risk model (1) for the wealth of a miner that follows






In the sequel, unless otherwise stated, we set πW = 0.06 (so the net profit condition is
satisfied) and assume the miner to have a share p = 0.1 of the network hashpower. Figure
2a displays the infinite-time and finite-time ruin probability (with chosen time horizon to
be 6 hours) as a function of initial wealth using the formulas derived in Proposition 2.1.
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(a) ψ(u) (solid), ψ(u, 6h) (dashed) and ψ̂(u, 6h)
(dotted) as a function of initial wealth u.
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(b) E(R6h) − u (solid) , V (u, 6h) − u (dashed),
V̂ (u, 6h)− u (dotted) and as a function of initial
wealth u.
Figure 2: Ruin probabilities and expected profit as a function of initial wealth for a miner
that follows the protocol with hashpower p = 0.1 and electricity price πW = 0.06, together
with the confidence bands of a Monte-Carlo simulation.
Figure 2b plots the expected profit at that deterministic time horizon t = 6 hours (recall
that the expected profit corresponds to the expected surplus under ruin constraints net of
the initial wealth u) using formula (7) and compares it to E(Rt)− u = (pλb− c)t, which
is the expected surplus, again net of the initial wealth, of a miner without that ruin con-
straint (we will refer to that latter quantity as the target profitability in the sequel). One
sees that with increasing initial capital the two quantities get closer, as the event of ruin
then becomes more and more unlikely. In Figure 2b we also give the quantity V̂ (u, t) as
derived in Proposition 2.2 for an exponential time horizon T with expected value 6 hours,
net of initial capital u (dashed line). When comparing the deterministic time horizon to
the random time horizon with the same expected value, it is clear that the exponential
distribution overweights time horizons below the expected value of 6 hours, so that it is
intuitive that the expected gain is below the one for the deterministic time horizon (as,
due to the net profit condition, the expected income increases with the time horizon). But
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this difference diminishes for large values of u, as they both approach the target profitabil-
ity. In order to double-check the validity of the obtained explicit formulas, we also plot
in Figure 2 asymptotic 95%-confidence bands of an independent Monte Carlo simulation
of all the quantities using 250’000 sample paths, and the exact formulas are nicely in the
center of these bands (in Figure 2a these bands are so narrow that one can barely observe
them with the naked eye). Another way to read Figure 2a is that it quantifies the amount
of initial capital u needed in order to ensure survival within 6 hours, or at any time in the
future, for any given probability. Note that as u increases, more and more terms in the
finite-sum expression (4) for ψ(u, t) disappear, causing the jumps in the curve. Figure 2a
also suggests that switching from a deterministic to a random exponential time horizon
with the same mean does not impact the resulting ruin probability substantially. This fur-
ther justifies the switch from a deterministic to a random time horizon with its enormous
computational advantages, particularly for the selfish mining case. The time horizon of
6 hours in Figure 2 was in part chosen to ensure a satisfactory accuracy when evaluating
formula (7). While there is no issue for ψ(u) and ψ(u, t), the recursive computation of
Abel-Gontcharov polynomials in that formula for V (u, t) becomes numerically unstable
for larger time horizons.
Figure 3 displays the ruin probability and expected profit for the larger time horizons 1
day, 1 week and 2 weeks for the otherwise same set of parameters. Figure 3a illustrates
quantitatively how ψ̂(u, t) approaches the infinite-time ruin probability ψ(u) as the ex-
pected time horizon t increases.
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(a) ψ̂(u, t) as a function of initial wealth u for
varying time horizon: (dotted) t = 1d, (dashed)
t = 1w, (dash-dotted) t = 2w, and (solid) t =∞.
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Expected profit (in millions of USD)
(b) V̂ (u, t)−u as a function of initial wealth u for
varying time horizons: (dotted) t = 1d, (dashed)
t = 1w, and (dash-dotted) t = 2w.
Figure 3: Ruin probabilities and expected profit over an exponential time horizon as a
function of initial wealth for varying time horizon with hashpower p = 0.1 and electricity
price πW = 0.06.
Figure 3b depicts the expected profit over an exponential time horizon with varying mean,
using the explicit formula of Proposition 2.2. It also contains a comparison with the re-
spective target profitability without the ruin constraint for each case. Note that the latter
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increases with the time horizon due to the net profit condition. For smaller time horizons,
the risk of going to ruin is quickly mitigated when increasing the initial reserve, which
makes the convergence of the expected profit towards the targeted one swifter.
Let us now investigate the effect of the electricity price and the hashpower on the ex-
pected surplus under ruin constraints. We consider a random time horizon with mean
2 weeks now, and compute the expected surplus for various initial wealth levels. Figure
4a plots the respective surplus V̂ (u, t) determined in Proposition 2.2 as a function of the
electricity price for a fixed hashpower p = 0.1 (in this plot we do not subtract u in order
to show the decline of V̂ (u, t) more prominently). Rising electricity prices clearly make
mining less profitable, and reduces the surplus to virtually zero for πW around 0.08 even
for quite large initial capital. Figure 4b then displays the expected profit as a function
of hashpower, when the electricity price is fixed at πW = 0.06. One observes that the
expected profit increases almost linearly in the hashpower when the net profit condition
holds.
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(a) V̂ (u, 2w) as a function of electricity price πW
with hashpower p = 0.1 for varying initial wealth:
(dotted) u = 1.1, (dashed) u = 4.1, and (dash-
dotted) u = 8.1.














(b) V̂ (u, 2w) − u as a function of hashpower p
with electricity price πW = 0.06 for varying initial
wealth: (dotted) u = 1.1, (dashed) u = 4.1, and
(dash-dotted) u = 8.1.
Figure 4: Expected surplus as a function of electricity price (left) and expected profit as
a function of hashpower (right) under ruin constraints over an exponential time horizon
(mean 2 weeks), for varying initial wealth (in tens of thousands of USD).
The magnitude of the reward for discovering a block makes mining very profitable in
expectation, but the rarity of such an event also makes it very risky. Miners who seek a
more steady income are then incentivized to form teams, called mining pools (Rosenfeld
[19]), which reduce the variance of the reward process. Our results may be used to gain
insight into how beneficial it is for a miner to join a mining pool. Consider 100 miners
that start looking for blocks in isolation. Each of them owns 1% of the computing power
and has an initial capital of amount $10, 000. We wish to compare the ruin probabil-
ity and the expected profit of mining pools of increasing size. We simply assume that
when two miners join forces, the resulting pool then has 2% of the overall hashpower and
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u∗ = $20, 000 as initial capital. Figure 5 displays the ruin probability and expected profit
per miner over an exponential time horizon as a function of the size of the mining pool for
varying time horizon t ∈ {1d, 1w, 2w}. The expected profit per miner plotted in Figure
5b corresponds to the expected profit of the mining pool divided by the number of its
members. One clearly can see the advantage of joining a pool, when the risk of ruin is
added to the analysis.














(a) ψ̂(u∗, t) as a function of the size of the mining
pool for time horizon t = 1d (dotted), t = 1w
(dashed) and t = 2w (dash-dotted).











(b) V̂ (u∗, t)−u∗ divided by the number of miners
as a function of that number with t = 1d (dotted),
t = 1w (dashed) and t = 2w (dash-dotted).
Figure 5: Ruin probability and expected profit per miner over an exponential time horizon
as a function of size of the mining pool for varying time horizon.
Note that the proportional reward system considered here is slightly simplistic, as it does
not prevent miners from switching the pool, which can be an issue in practice, see for
instance Rosenfeld [19] and Lewenberg et al. [16].
4.2 Expected profit computations for a selfish miner
We now turn to the study of the profitability of selfish mining using model (19). Assuming





qp(1− p)2 + 4p2 − 2p3
1 + 2p− p2 ,
where p denotes the hashpower and q is the connectivity parameter. Figure 6 displays the
net profit condition frontier as a function of hashpower and electricity price for various
values of q. For instance, one can read off from the plot that for a connectivity parameter
q = 0.5 and hashpower p = 0.1 the net profit condition is satisfied whenever πW ≤ 0.43.
Note that the net profit condition for q = 1 is identical to that of a miner following the
protocol, since it refers to the stationary distribution (cf. Remark 3.2 for further details).
Figure 7 compares the ruin probability and expected profit of a selfish miner (as deter-
mined by Theorem B.1) and a miner following the protocol, plotted as a function of initial
16































Figure 6: Net profit condition frontier of a selfish miner as a function of electricity price
and hashpower for various values of the connectivity parameter q.
wealth for q = 0.5, p = 0.1 and πW = 0.04 (so the net profit condition holds, cf. Figure 6).
Here the exponential time horizon is chosen to have a mean of 6 hours. The plot also gives
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(a) ψ̂(u, t) (solid) and ψ̂0(u, t) (dashed) as a func-
tion of initial wealth u.
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Expected profit (in USD)
V0(u, 6h)
V(u, 6h)
(b) V̂ (u, t) − u (solid) and V̂0(u, t) − u (dashed)
as a function of initial wealth u.
Figure 7: Ruin probability and expected profit over an exponential time horizon T ∼
Exp(6h) as a function of initial wealth for a miner following the protocol and for a selfish
miner with electricity price πW = 0.04, hashpower p = 0.1, and connectivity q = 0.5,
together with the confidence bands of a Monte Carlo simulation.
(the very narrow) 95% confidence bands of an independent Monte Carlo simulation with
250’000 sample paths for ψ̂0(u) and V̂0(u, t), which nicely shows that the exact formulas
are within these bounds. Note the substantial gap between the honest and the selfish
miner’s ruin probability in Figure 7a and expected profit in Figure 7b.
Let us now look into the impact of the connectivity on the expected profit of a selfish
miner. The connectivity depends on the topography of the network as well as on the
information propagation delay between the nodes. Göbel et al. [7] showed that the con-
nectivity strongly influences the relative revenue of selfish miners. Figure 8 investigates
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the impact of q on the absolute revenue of a selfish miner. In Figure 8a, we plot V̂0(u, t)−u
as a function of initial wealth u for various levels of q (the choice of the other parame-
ters ensures that the net profit condition holds even under the lowest connectivity regime
q = 0.25). The plot also confirms the relative proximity of the value functions when
following the protocol and when withholding blocks with connectivity q = 1, respectively
(cf. Remark 3.2). However, for small values of u the difference can still be substantial in
absolute terms, see Figure 8b where we plot the difference V̂ (u, t)− V̂0(u, t) directly.
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Expected profit (in tens of millions USD)
(a) V̂0(u, 2w)−u as a function of initial wealth u
with haspower p = 0.1 and electricity price πW =
0.03 for varying connectivity level: q = 0.25 (dot-
ted), q = 0.5 (dashed), q = 0.75 (dash-dotted),
q = 1 (solid).
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Expected profit difference (in millions USD)
(b) V̂ (u, 2w) − V̂0(u, 2w) as a function of initial
wealth u with hashpower p = 0.1, electricity price
πW = 0.03 and connectivity q = 1.
Figure 8: Expected profit of a selfish miner over an exponential time horizon (mean 2
weeks) as a function of initial wealth (left) compared to the expected profit of a miner
following the protocol (right).
Figure 9a plots the expected surplus under ruin constraints as a function of the electricity
price, and in Figure 9b we see how the choice of the hashpower influences the expected
profit V̂0(u, t)− u of a selfish miner.
We observe that the influence of the initial wealth, electricity price and hashpower on the
expected profit of a selfish miner is similar (in terms of shape) to that of a miner following
the protocol, but – compared in absolute terms – withholding blocks leads to substantial
losses in expected profit even in high connectivity regimes like q = 0.75. This confirms
that a miner is better off by following the protocol in terms of ’absolute’ (as opposed
to ’relative’ in Eyal and Sirer [6]) revenue under solvency constraints. In Section 5, we
will check whether this also holds true when taking into account an adjustment in the
cryptopuzzle difficulty.
4.3 Comparison with the original selfish mining strategy
The selfish mining strategy considered in this work differs from the selfish mining strategy
introduced by Eyal and Sirer [6], cf. Remark 3.1. This section is devoted to the numerical
18
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(a) V̂0(u, 2w) as a function of electricity price πW
with hashpower p = 0.1 and initial wealth u =
$410, 000.
















(b) V̂0(u, 2w) − u as a function of hashpower
p with electricity price πW = 0.03 and initial
wealth u = $410, 000.
Figure 9: Expected profit of a selfish miner over an exponential time horizon (mean 2
weeks) as a function of electricity price (left) and hashpower (right) for varying connec-
tivity level q, and a comparison with a miner following the protocol (solid).
comparison in terms of ruin probability and expected profit of the two strategies. As
for Eyal and Sirer’s selfish mine strategy there are no analytical formulas available, we
will use crude Monte Carlo estimators in that case. We set the time horizon to t = 336
(two weeks) and let the hashpower vary in p ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.4}. Figure 10 displays
the ruin probability of a miner that implements the standard selfish mining strategy
ψ̂ES(u, t = 2w) and our variant ψ̂(u, t = 2w). Figure 11 displays the expected profit
over an exponential time horizon of a miner that implements the standard selfish mining
strategy V̂ES(u, t = 2w) and our variant V̂ (u, t = 2w). The results are very close when
considering values of hashpower ranging in p ∈ {0.01, 0.1}, see Figures 10a,10b, 11a and
11b. At such hashpower levels, the likelihood of building up a large stock of blocks
plummets, leading to similar results for both strategies. For larger value of hashpower
p ∈ {0.25, 0.4}, the ruin probability is a bit higher when implementing Eyal and Sirer’s
strategy, see Figures 10c and 10d. This is mainly due to the delay in getting the reward
when the stock of blocks reaches the level 2 (the reward arises one block later within Eyal
and Sirer’s framework, see Remark 3.1). When ruin is unlikely, that is for large initial
reserves, Eyal and Sirer’s strategy outperforms the simplified one, see Figures 11c and
11d. The latter is hence only preferable when ruin poses a real threat. A miner should
then empty its stock and cash the rewards to avoid bankruptcy. However, one may also
conclude from these plots that the simplified strategy already nicely captures most of
the model effects, with the advantage of leading to explicit formulas for the involved
quantities.
Remark 4.1. One could argue that the reward for finding a block becomes available to
the miner only when the transaction that transfers the reward to the miner’s wallet is
confirmed. A transaction is not yet confirmed if it belongs to a branch of the blockchain
competing with another one, namely when a fork is on-going. If we assume that the
funds are not available as long as the fork has not been resolved, then the counterpart of
19
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Figure 10: Ruin probability over an exponential time horizon T ∼ Exp(2w) when imple-
menting Eyal and Sirer selfish mining strategy (dotted) and the simplified one (dashed)
for a miner with varying hashpower p ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.4}.
(20) and (21) for the reward function of a miner who implements Eyal and Sirer’s selfish
mining scheme is
f [(Zn−1, (ξi)i≤n, ζn] =

0, if Zn−1 ∈ {0, 1},∑n
i=n∗+1 ξi, if Zn−1 = 2 & ξn = 0,
0, if Zn−1 = 2 & ξn = 1,
0, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 0 & ζn = 0,
1, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 0 & ζn = 1,
2, if Zn−1 = 0∗ & ξn = 1,
(27)
where n∗ = sup{k ≤ n − 1 : Zk = 0}. Note that the dependency of the reward process
on the current and past values of the sequence (ξn)n≥1 makes it non-Markovian, so that
the techniques used in the proof of Theorem B.1 and Corollary C.1 are not applicable.
The income processes (21) and (27) lead to the same number of rewards, but the timing
is different. Under Eyal and Sirer’s assumption, the rewards are staggered in time while
they are all earnt whenever the fork situation ends (which means later) in the case of
20
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(d) p = 0.4.
Figure 11: Expected profit over an exponential time horizon T ∼ Exp(2w) when imple-
menting Eyal and Sirer selfish mining strategy and the simplified one for a miner with
varying hashpower p ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.4}.
(27). The deferral of capital gains in our model jeopardizes the solvency of the miner and
reduces the expected profit. The results displayed in Figures 10 and 11 would then look
less optimistic by choosing (27) over (21).
5 Expected profit when including a difficulty adjust-
ment
Mining (at least on the bitcoin blockchain) boils down to drawing random numbers,
referred to as hashes uniformly inside the set {0, . . . , 2256 − 1}. The block is mined if
the computed hash is smaller than some target L. Calibrating L helps to maintain a
steady flow of blocks in the blockchain. As each trial (of the system) for mining a block is
independent of the others and leads to a success with very small probability, the overall
number of successes is binomially distributed and will be very well approximated by a
Poisson random variable. Hence the Poisson process assumption for the occurrence of
mined blocks is in fact very natural. In the bitcoin blockchain, the target L is set so as to
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ensure that 6 blocks are generated per hour. The target may be estimated by comparing
2256 to the number of hashes computed by the network in ten minutes. On January 1,
2020, the network was computing 97.014 exahashes per second. The difficulty is then
estimated by L = 2256/(H/6), where H = 97.01 × 1018 × 3600 is the number of hashes
computed per hour by the network. The difficulty is adjusted every 2, 016 blocks by
changing the target L to
L∗ = L× t
∗
336 ,
where t∗ is the time (in hours) it took to mine 2, 016 blocks (here 2016/6 = 336 hours
is the time it should have taken to mine 2, 016 blocks). The difficulty adjustment was
studied in Bowden et al. [4] and led them to conclude that the block arrival process is well
captured by a non-homogeneous Poisson process. Following their terminology, we refer
to the time elapsed between two difficulty adjustments as a segment.
We now want to quantitatively address whether selfish mining is worthwhile when con-
sidering the possibly implied adjustment of the cryptopuzzle difficulty. We do so in a
simplified setup, where only Sam may switch between selfish mining and following the
protocol, whereas everyone else follows the protocol. Concretely, we compute the ruin
probability and expected profit of Sam over two segments when
(i) he is following the protocol during both segments,
(ii) he applies selfish mining during the first segment and resumes following the protocol
during the second segment.
For (i), we compute the expected profit using the result of Proposition 2.2 by setting the
average time horizon to t = 672 (the number of hours in four weeks). We assume that the
arrival intensity of the blocks in the blockchain remains unchanged over the two segments
with λ = 6, as does the cryptopuzzle difficulty L.
For (ii), we proceed as follows. Selfish mining slows down the pace at which the blocks
are added to the blockchain, and the number of blocks wasted exactly corresponds to the
number of passages of the Markov chain (Zn)n≥0 through the state 0∗. We know that
once stationarity is reached, the probability for (Zn)n≥0 to be in state 0∗ is
p(1− p)
1 + 2p− p2 .
We therefore approximate the arrival process in this first segment by a homogeneous
Poisson process with intensity
λ1 = λ×
(
1− p(1− p)1 + 2p− p2
)
.
When blocks are being withheld, the average time required to mine 2, 016 blocks increases
from 336 to t1 = 2016/λ1. We hence compute the ruin probability and expected surplus
over the first segment using Corollary C.1 and Theorem B.1 respectively with time horizon
t1. Selfish mining during the first segment then leads to a downward adjustment of the
4Source: blockchain.com
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cryptopuzzle difficulty to L2 = L× t1/336 that will be in force during the second segment.
As the miner resumes following the protocol on that second segment, the block arrival
process becomes again a proper homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ2 to be
determined as follows. Let H be the number of hashes computed per hour (hashrate) by





The miner’s ruin probability and surplus over the second segment are now computed
using the formulas of Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 using as initial wealth the miner’s expected
surplus over the first segment, a block arrival intensity equal to λ2 and a reduced time
horizon equal to t2 = 2016/λ2.
We consider a miner who owns a share p = 0.2 of the network computing power. If he
follows the protocol, then the net profit condition holds if πW < 0.065. If he withholds
blocks on the first segment, then the net profit condition frontier depends on the elec-
tricity price and the hashpower provided that his connectivity is fixed, for instance set to
q = 0.75. Figure 12 shows the net profit condition frontiers for a selfish miner on Segment
1 who starts following again the protocol on Segment 2.


















Net profit condition frontier on segment 1
(a) Net profit condition frontier on Segment 1















Net profit condition frontier on segment 2
(b) Net profit condition frontier on Segment 2.
Figure 12: Net profit condition frontier on Segment 1 and 2 for a selfish miner.
In absence of ruin considerations, selfish mining on Segment 1 is profitable only if the
price of electricity is lower than 0.058, see Figure 12a. Only when the selfish miner owns
the totality of the hashpower, is selfish mining as profitable as following the protocol.
On Segment 2, the profitability is always greater than when following the protocol. The
profitability on Segment 2 holds in our case if the electricity price is lower than 0.074, see
Figure 12b. It is interesting to note that by increasing the hashpower beyond a certain
threshold we actually lower the profitability during Segment 2. At higher hashpower lev-
els, the probability of the Markov chain (Zn)n≥0 visiting state 0∗ becomes small. In that
case fewer blocks are being wasted, which in turn reduces the downward adjustment of
the cryptopuzzle difficulty and hence the profitability during Segment 2.
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Figure 13 shows the ruin probability of a selfish miner and a miner following the protocol
as a function of initial wealth for a range of electricity prices. From a ruin probability
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Figure 13: Ruin probability over two segments as a function of initial wealth of a miner
following the protocol (solid) and a selfish miner (dashed) for various electricity prices
with hashpower p = 0.2 and connectivity q = 0.75.
perspective, reducing the difficulty adjustment does not compensate for the risk involved
in implementing selfish mining.
Figure 14 displays the expected profit of a selfish miner and a miner following the
protocol as a function of initial wealth for a range of electricity prices. One can observe the
different profit and loss profile of a selfish miner compared to that of a miner following the
protocol on both segments. If the net profit condition holds when following the protocol,
then it also holds for the second segment when blocks were withheld during the first
segment. For electricity prices πW = 0.05, 0.06, the expected profit as a function of u
reaches a plateau of level
(c− bλp)× t (28)
when following the protocol, and
(c− bλ2p)× t2, (29)
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Figure 14: Expected profit over two segments as a function of initial wealth of a miner
following the protocol (solid) and a selfish miner (dashed) for various electricity prices
with hashpower p = 0.2 and connectivity q = 0.75.
when selfish mining is applied during the first segment. For πW = 0.05, the plateau when
following the protocol (28) is higher than the plateau when withholding blocks (29), but
the expected profit at lower initial wealth is greater for the selfish miner, see Figure 14a.
The exact opposite holds when πW = 0.06, see Figure 14b. The latter is probably the
most desirable situation for a selfish miner. For πW = 0.07, the net profit condition no
longer holds when following the protocol which entails a loss, it holds however on the sec-
ond segment of the selfish miner but it does not compensate for the loss incurred during
the first segment, see Figure 14c. Selfish mining helps at least in slightly mitigating the
losses in this case. For electricity prices πW > 0.074, the net profit condition breaks down
in each case, resulting in huge losses for both the selfish and the honest miner (cf. Figure
14d ).
The above analysis allowed us to distinguish situations where selfish mining can be con-
sidered worthwile and when it may not. In particular, it turns out that selfish mining can
be advisable when following the protocol is not profitable.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a risk and profitability analysis framework adapted to the profit
and loss profile of blockchain miners. The surplus of the miners is modelled as a stochas-
tic process akin to the risk process in insurance risk theory. In addition to studying the
standard ruin probability, we have defined a value function as the expected surplus over
an exponentially distributed time horizon. This assumption allowed us to work out closed
form expressions for the expected profit of a miner that follows the prescribed protocol,
and of a miner who seeks to optimize his expected profit by withholding blocks. The
explicit solutions enabled a sensitivity analysis with respect to the model parameters and
features, and a profitability comparison between the two types of miners.
We find that mining is a business for risk lovers as large expected profits are compensated
by great odds of running out of financial resources. While earlier studies suggested that
selfish mining can be worthwhile, our analysis gives a quantitative description of the sig-
nificantly increased risk caused by the delay of capital gains, so that in an analysis that
includes the consideration of ruin, selfish mining becomes less attractive. At the same
time, we find that selfish mining can be a reasonable strategy if following the protocol is
not profitable.
The main purpose of the present study was to provide a concrete link between the analysis
of mining strategies and modelling tools in applied probability and mathematics. There
are of course various directions for future research concerning refinements and extensions
of the approach proposed here. It will be interesting in future studies to account for the
variability of the electricity cost over time and the even higher variability of the miner’s
reward due to the well known volatility of the Bitcoins. The incorporation of transaction
fees will also become more relevant in the future as the reward for finding blocks keeps
being halved as the number of remaining Bitcoins to be issued declines. In addition, it
would be nice to look into further consequences of selfish mining on the remaining network
participants beyond the ones considered here.
We have found that deferring the reward associated with newly found blocks puts the
miners’ solvency at risk. This motivates a stochastic control problem for a miner to
decide whether to hide or release a block depending on the current financial situation.
The approach of Sapirshtein et al. [21] could then be re-examined within the framework
of the present paper. Finally, the organization of selfish mining in pools may lead to
additional features beyond the ones considered in the present approach.
A Abel-Gontcharov polynomials
Let U = {ui , i ≥ 1} be a sequence of real non-decreasing numbers. The (unique) family
{Gn(x|U) , n ≥ 0} of Abel-Gontcharov polynomials of degree n in x attached to U is
defined as follows. Starting with G0(x|U) = 1, the polynomials Gn(x|U) satisfy the
differential equations
G(1)n (x|U) = nGn−1(x|EU), (30)
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where EU is the shifted family {ui+1 , i ≥ 1}, and with boundary conditions
Gn(u1|U) = 0, n ≥ 1. (31)












The polynomials Gn, n ≥ 1, can be interpreted in terms of the joint distribution of the
order statistics (U1:n, . . . , Un:n) of a sample of n independent uniform random variables
on (0, 1). Indeed, for 0 ≤ x ≤ u1 ≤ . . . ≤ un ≤ 1, we have that
P [U1:n ≤ u1, . . . , Un:n ≤ un and U1:n ≥ x] = (−1)nGn(x|u1, . . . , un).
This last interpretation is used in the proof of Proposition 2.1. The numerical evaluation
of (7) then relies on the recursive relations







un−kk+1Gk(x|U), n ≥ 1. (33)
Formula (33) follows from an Abelian expansion of xn based on (30), and (31). For further
details we refer to Lefèvre and Picard [15], where also applications in risk and epidemic
modelling are given.
B Proof of Theorem B.1
Theorem B.1. For any u ≥ 0, the value function under selfish mining as defined in (24)
satisfies the differential equation (45) with boundary conditions (43) and (44), a solution
of which is given by
V̂0(u, t) = A1 eρ1 u + eρ2 u [A2 cos (ρ3 u) + A3 sin (ρ3 u)] + u+ C, (34)
where ρ1 and ρ2 ± iρ3 are the only solutions in ρ of the equation
(D1 ρ+ D2 ) e2 ρ b + D3 eρ b = D4 ρ3 + D5 ρ2 + D6 ρ+ D7 (35)
with negative real parts. The constants C,D1, . . . , D7 are given by
C = −λ
2t3 {λpb [(q − 2) p2 + (4− 2 q) p+ q] + c (p2 − 2 p− 1)}
λ2t2 (p2 − 2 p− 1)− (p+ 2)λ t− 1
− λ t
2 (2bp2λ− c (p+ 2))− ct
λ2t2 (p2 − 2 p− 1)− (p+ 2)λ t− 1 (36)
D1 =
pc
1− p , D2 =
p (1 + t (2− p)λ)
t (1− p) , D3 = (1− p)λ q, D4 =
c3
λ2 (1− p) p,
D5 =
c2 (3 + λ t (p+ 2))
λ2t (1− p) p , D6 =
(3 + λ t (2p+ 1)) c (λ t+ 1)
t2λ2 (1− p) p , and
D7 =
1 + λ t (p+ 2) + λ2t2 (2p+ 1) + λ3t3p (p(1− q)(2− p) + q)
λ2t3 (1− p) p .
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B1 = −ρ21 + λ2p2 e2bρ1/c2,
B2 = −ρ22 + ρ23 + λ2p2 e2bρ2 cos(2bρ3)/c2, (38)
B3 = −2ρ2ρ3 + λ2p2 e2bρ2 sin(2bρ3)/c2.
Using the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2.2 yields the following system
of advanced differential equations
0 = cV̂ ′0(u, t) + (λp+ 1/t)V̂0(u, t)− λpV̂1(u, t)− u/t,
0 = cV̂ ′1(u, t) + (λ+ 1/t)V̂1(u, t))− λpV̂0(u+ 2b, t)− λ(1− p)V̂0∗(u, t)− u/t,
0 = cV̂ ′0∗(u, t) + (λ+ 1/t)V̂0∗(u, t)− λpV̂0∗(u+ 2b, t)− λ(1− p)qV̂0∗(u+ b, t)
−λ(1− p)(1− q)V̂0(u, t)− u/t.
(39)
Here again the derivative is always with respect to the first argument. From the first


















λ(1− p) V̂1(u, t)−
λp





λ2 (1− p) pV̂
′′
0 (u, t) +
c (2 + (p+ 1)λ t)
λ2 (1− p) tp V̂0(u, t)
+(λ t+ 1) (λ t p+ 1)
λ2 (1− p) t2p V̂0(u, t)−
p
1− pV̂0(u+ 2b, t)
−1 + λ t (p+ 1)
λ2 (1− p) t2p u−
c
λ2 (1− p) tp, (41)
with boundary conditions V̂0(0, t) = V̂1(0, t) = V̂0∗(0, t) = 0. Substituting (41) into the





λ2 (1− p) pV̂
′′′
0 (u, t) +
(3 + λ t (p+ 2)) c2
λ2t (1− p) p V̂
′′
0 (u, t)
+(λ t+ 1) c (3 + λ t (2p+ 1))
λ2t2 (1− p) p V̂
′
0(u, t)
+1 + λ t (p+ 2) + λ
2t2 (2p+ 1) + λ3t3p ((q − 1) p2 + 2p (1− q) + q)
t3λ2 (1− p) p V̂0 (u, t)
−λ q (1− p) V̂0 (u+ b, t) +
(λ t (p− 2)− 1) p
(1− p) t V̂0(u+ 2b, t)
− cp1− pV̂
′
0 (u+ 2 b, t)−
1 + λ t (p+ 2)− λ2t2 (p2 − 2 p− 1)
t3λ2 (1− p) p u
−(2 + λ t (p+ 2)) c
λ2t2 (1− p) p . (42)
The above boundary conditions now translate to







and from the problem construction we again have the linear growth condition
V̂0(u, t) ≤ ku for some k ≥ 0. (44)
This equation constitutes another instance of an advanced functional differential equation,
and concerning mathematical considerations of the existence and uniqueness of a solution
to it, we refer to the corresponding comments in Remark B.1, where here we even have
the additional complication of order 3. We will again construct its solution explicitly (one
can again confirm that the solution is the correct one by comparing it to the outcome of
a stochastic simulation of V0(u)). Concretely, we seek a solution of the form V̂0(u, t) =
V̂ part0 (u, t) + V̂ hom0 (u, t), where V̂
part
0 (u, t) is a particular solution of (42) and V̂ hom0 (u, t)
solves the homogeneous equation associated to (42)
0 = c
3
λ2 (1− p) pV̂
′′′
0 (u, t) +
(3 + λ t (p+ 2)) c2
λ2t (1− p) p V̂
′′
0 (u, t)
+(λ t+ 1) c (3 + λ t (2p+ 1))
λ2t2 (1− p) p V̂
′
0(u, t)
+1 + λ t (p+ 2) + λ
2t2 (2p+ 1) + λ3t3p ((q − 1) p2 + 2p (1− q) + q)
t3λ2 (1− p) p V̂0 (u, t)
−λ q (1− p) V̂0 (u+ b, t) +
(λ t (p− 2)− 1) p
(1− p) t V̂0(u+ 2b, t)
− cp1− pV̂
′
0 (u+ 2 b, t) . (45)
Inserting a particular solution of the form V̂ part0 (u, t) = Bu+ C in (42) yields B = 1 and
C = −λ
2t3 {λpb [(q − 2) p2 + (4− 2 q) p+ q] + c (p2 − 2 p− 1)}
λ2t2 (p2 − 2 p− 1)− (p+ 2)λ t− 1
− λ t
2 (2bp2λ− c (p+ 2))− ct
λ2t2 (p2 − 2 p− 1)− (p+ 2)λ t− 1 .
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Trying the ansatz V̂ (u, t) = eρu in the homogeneous equation (45), we get the character-
istic equation




1− p ≥ 0, D2 =
p (1 + λ t (2− p))
t (1− p) ≥ 0, D3 = (1− p)λ q ≥ 0,
D4 =
c3
λ2 (1− p) p ≥ 0, D5 =
c2 (3 + λ t (p+ 2))
tλ2 (1− p) p ≥ 0,
D6 =
(3 + λ t (2p+ 1)) c (λ t+ 1)
t2λ2 (1− p) p ≥ 0 and
D7 =
1 + λ t (p+ 2) + λ2t2 (2p+ 1) + λ3t3p (p(1− q)(2− p) + q)
λ2t3 (1− p) p ≥ 0.
Note that due to the linear growth condition for V̂0(u, t) in u, any candidate for ρ needs
to have negative real part. In fact, in the following lemma we will prove that (46) has
exactly three such solutions with negative real part.
Lemma B.1. For any choice of parameters λ, c, b, t > 0 and 0 < p, q < 1, Equation (46)
has exactly three solutions in ρ with negative real part, one of which is real-valued.
Proof. Define the functions
f(ρ) = D4 ρ3 + D5 ρ2 + D6 ρ+ D7 and g(ρ) = (D1 ρ+ D2 ) e2 ρ b + D3 eρ b,
and note that both are holomorphic in the complex plane. We will first show that all
three zeros of f(ρ) in the complex plane have negative real part. Define a closed curve K
by considering the arc [−iR,+iR] on the imaginary axis together with the semi-circle of
radius R to the left of it that is centered in zero, with R→∞. Going on the semi-circle
from iR to −iR, the term D4 ρ3 dominates the value of f , and f(ρ) winds 1.5 times
around the origin on the way (from D4(ix)3 = −iD4x3 to D4(−ix)3 = +iD4x3 for x ∈ R).
For the part of K on the imaginary axis we have
f(ix) = D7 −D5x2 + i(D6x−D4x3), x ∈ R. (47)
As x goes from −∞ to +∞, the real part of (47) becomes positive at x1 = −
√
D7/D5
and again negative at x2 =
√
D7/D5, and the imaginary part of (47) is negative for x1
and positive for x2 if and only if
D4D7 < D5D6.
But the latter condition holds for any choice of parameters λ, c, b, t > 0 and 0 < p, q < 1,
which can be checked with a little algebra (in fact, writing D5D6−D4D7 as a polynomial
in the argument λt, one can verify that all the coefficients of that polynomial are posi-
tive). Due to D4(ix)3 = −iD4x3, this then means that 1.5 further windings are added on
the part of K on the imaginary axis, so that altogether we have 3 windings around the
origin when going along K. By Cauchy’s argument principle for holomorphic functions,
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we hence have established that f(ρ) has three zeros in the negative halfplane.
In order to extend this result now to f(ρ) − g(ρ) also having exactly three zeros in the
negative halfplane, we invoke Rouché’s theorem. The latter guarantees the same number
of zeroes for f(ρ) and f(ρ)− g(ρ) inside the closed curve K, if
| − g(ρ)| < |f(ρ)| (48)
for all ρ on the curve K. On the semi-circle, (48) is clear due to the dominance of D4 ρ3
as R → ∞. This is likewise true for the part of K on the imaginary axis for sufficiently
large R, so that we are only left to deal with ρ ∈ [−iR, iR] for not so large R. Note that
g(ix) = D3 cos(xb)+D2 cos(2xb)−D1x sin(2xb)+i(D1x cos(2xb)+D2 sin(2xb)+D3 sin(xb))
for any x ∈ R. Together with (47), the condition (48) now translates into
(D1x cos(2xb) +D2 sin(2xb) +D3 sin(xb))2 + (D3 cos(xb) +D2 cos(2xb)−D1x sin(2xb))2
< (D7 −D5x2)2 + (D6x−D4x3)2 (49)
for all x ∈ R. Observe that both sides of (49) are symmetric around x = 0. The right-hand
side of (49) can be written as
D27 + (D26 − 2D5D7)x2 + (D25 − 2D4D6)x4 +D24x6.
and the left-hand side of (49) has the following expansion around zero
(D2 +D3)2 + (D21 − 2bD1D3 − b2D2D3)x2 +O(x4).
In order to show D7 > D2 + D3, one writes D7 − D3 − D2 again as a polynomial in
the argument λt and can then verify that all coefficients of that polynomial are posi-
tive. In a similar way, one can show that D26 > 2D5D7 and D25 > 2D4D6 as well as
D25−2D4D6 > D21−2bD1D3− b2D2D3 for all b > 0. One then sees that (49) indeed holds
for all x ∈ R, so that (48) applies and we have established the existence of exactly three
zeros of (46) in the negative halfplane.
It only remains to show that exactly one of these zeros is real-valued. In fact, g is positive
and monotone increasing with lim
ρ→−∞
g(ρ) = 0 and lim
ρ→+∞
g(ρ) = +∞. On the other hand,
with D4 > 0 we see that lim
ρ→−∞
f(ρ) = −∞ and lim
ρ→+∞
f(ρ) = +∞. The derivative of f
f ′(ρ) = 3D4ρ2 + 2D5ρ+D6














f(r1) = − (1− q) (1− p)λ ≤ 0 and f(r2) = −
(−27 pq + 23 p+ 4) (1− p)λ
27p ≤ 0,
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the function f is negative for ρ ≤ r2 and cannot intersect with g there. At the same time,
f(0)− g(0) = 1 + t
2 (−p2 + 2 p+ 1)λ2 + t (p+ 2)λ
λ2 (1− p) pt3 ≥ 0,
which implies the existence of a unique negative ρ1 ∈ (r2, 0) such that f(ρ1) = g(ρ1) (there
must also exist some real solution ρ > 0 to (46) as g grows to infinity faster than f , but a
positive solution is not relevant here). Since f(ρ) = f(ρ) and g(ρ) = g(ρ), where z denotes
the complex conjugate, for every non-real zero ρ its complex conjugate ρ also must be a
zero, so that the second and third root of (46) are complex conjugates ρ2 ± iρ3.
The solution of the homogeneous equation is then of the form
V̂ hom0 (u, t) = A1 eρ1 u + eρ2 u [A2 cos (ρ3 u) + A3 sin (ρ3 u)] , (50)
which together with the particular solution V̂ part0 provides the generic solutions of the
equation (42) with
V̂0(u, t) = A1 eρ1 u + eρ2 u [A2 cos (ρ3 u) + A3 sin (ρ3 u)] + bu+ C. (51)
Finally, the boundary conditions (43) lead, after some algebra, to the system of equations
(37) for the determination of A1, A2 and A3. 2
Remark B.1. Like for Proposition 2.2 (see Remark 2.1), the uniqueness of the solution
to advanced functional differential equation (45) derived above is not evident from the type
of given boundary conditions. Equation (45) involves two advanced arguments at u + b




∣∣∣∣Z0 = z) = A1 eρ1 u + eρ2 u [A2 cos (ρ3 u) + A3 sin (ρ3 u)] + u+ C
holds for u ∈ [0, 2b] as an additional boundary condition to ensure that (24) and (34)
coincide. One can then for instance confirm that the proposed solution is the correct one
by verifying the additionally imposed boundary condition with the outcome of a stochastic
simulation of V0(u) over u ∈ [0, 2b] (which we did for various choices of parameters). In
any case, stochastic simulation of V0(u) over the entire range u ∈ [0,∞) also confirms
that in fact our obtained solution is the required one. 2
C Proof of Corollary C.1
Corollary C.1. For any u ≥ 0, the ruin probability ψ̂0(u, t) up to an exponential time
horizon T ∼ Exp(t) for a selfish miner starting in state 0 satisfies the differential equation
(55) with boundary conditions (56) and (57), a solution of which is given by
ψ̂0(u, t) = C1 eρ1 u + eρ2 u [C2 cos (ρ3 u) + C3 sin (ρ3 u)] , (52)
where ρ1 and ρ2 ± iρ3 are (again the same) only solutions in ρ of Equation (35) with
negative real parts. The constants C1, C2 and C3 are the solution of the linear equation












where B1, B2, B3 are again given by (38).
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The corollary follows indeed by a suitable adaptation of the proof of Theorem B.1.
Denote by ψ̂z(u, t) the ruin probability up to the finite exponential time horizon (with
mean t) when starting in state z (z ∈ {0, 1, 0∗}). Adapting the above arguments to the
case of the ruin probability, the system of advanced differential equations in this case is
0 = c ψ̂′0(u, t) + (λp+ 1/t) ψ̂0(u, t)− λp ψ̂1(u, t),
0 = c ψ̂′1(u, t) + (λ+ 1/t) ψ̂1(u, t)− λp ψ̂0(u+ 2b, t)− λ(1− p) ψ̂0∗(u, t),
0 = c ψ̂′0∗(u, t) + (λ+ 1/t) ψ̂0∗(u, t)− λp ψ̂0(u+ 2b, t)− λ(1− p)q ψ̂0(u+ b, t)
−λ(1− p)(1− q) ψ̂0(u, t),
(54)
which is exactly the homogeneous version of (39) (again the derivative is always with
respect to the first argument). However, now the boundary conditions are ψ̂0(0, t) =
ψ̂1(0, t) = ψ̂0∗(0, t) = 1, as in each state ruin is immediate when starting without initial
capital. Analogously to above this translates into a differential equation of order 3 with
advanced argument for ψ̂0(u, t), namely
0 = c
3
λ2 (1− p) p ψ̂
′′′
0 (u, t) +
(3 + λ t (p+ 2)) c2
λ2t (1− p) p ψ̂
′′
0(u, t)
+(λ t+ 1) c (3 + λ t (2p+ 1))
λ2t2 (1− p) p ψ̂
′
0(u, t)
+1 + λ t (p+ 2) + λ
2t2 (2p+ 1) + λ3t3p ((q − 1) p2 + 2p (1− q) + q)
t3λ2 (1− p) p ψ̂0 (u, t)
−λ q (1− p) ψ̂0 (u+ b, t) +
(λ t (p− 2)− 1) p
(1− p) t ψ̂0(u+ 2b, t)
− cp1− p ψ̂
′
0 (u+ 2 b, t) . (55)
The latter corresponds to the homogeneous equation of (42). However, the boundary
conditions are now slighty different and amount to
ψ̂0(0, t) = 1, ψ̂′0(0, t) = −
1
ct
and ψ̂′′0(0, t) =
λ2p2
c2




Furthermore, we know that
lim
u→∞
ψ̂0(u, t) = 0. (57)
Like in the proof of Theorem B.1, the solution can then be found to be of the form
ψ̂0(u, t) = C1 eρ1 u + eρ2 u [C2 cos (ρ3 u) + C3 sin (ρ3 u)] , (58)
where the linear system (53) for the constants C1, C2, C3 is finally derived from (56) by
some elementary calculations. 2
Remark C.1. In order to establish the uniqueness of the above solution for our prob-
lem setting, a similar approach as in Remark B.1 can be applied here (namely posing an
additional boundary condition whose validity can then be checked by stochastic simula-
tion). This then guarantees that our solution (52) indeed coincides with the actual ruin
probability for a selfish miner up to an exponential time horizon.
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